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Abstract
International markets for tradable emission permits (TEP) co-exist with national
energy taxation. A firm trading emission permits in the international market also
pays energy taxes in its host country, thus creating an interaction between the interna-
tional TEP-market and national energy taxes. In this paper we model that interaction
in a framework of a perfectly competitive international TEP-market, where hetero-
geneous firms trade their TEP endowments. National governments set energy taxes
non-cooperatively so as to maximize fiscal revenue from energy and profit taxes. We
identify the driving forces behind Nash equilibrium taxes. We show how they depend
on the total amount of TEPs in the market, on firms’ TEP-endowment and on the
number of participating countries. We also show how energy taxation varies with the
introduction of the market on a previously unregulated world. Finally, we highlight
the fact that the TEP-market does not achieve abatement cost efficiency, despite its
being perfectly competitive.
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1 Introduction
Tradable emission permits (TEPs) have became a major policy instrument with the entering
into force of two large-scale international markets. On the one hand, a worldwide market is
emerging for greenhouse gases under the Kyoto protocol.1 On the other hand, the European
Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) already organizes trading for permits on carbon
dioxide emissions among industrial firms within the EU.2 Yet, while being involved in such
markets, each country still remains responsible for its own fiscal policy, notably the one on
energy fuels, the main source of carbon dioxide emissions. Thus, we may expect strategic
behavior, since a country’s fiscal policy can indirectly affect the equilibrium TEP price and,
consequently, the compliance cost of the firms hosted in that country. Intriguingly, this
interplay between TEPs and national taxes has been largely disregarded in the literature.
The purpose of this article is to show that international markets for TEPs, such as under
the Kyoto protocol or the EU-ETS, may deeply reshape national energy taxation.
There are two main reasons for countries to reshape their national energy taxes when
joining an international TEP-market. Firstly, by accepting a supranational market-based
instrument the countries get rid of emission regulation (since the global cap on emissions is
set at the international level). However, they experience a cutback in their tax revenues since
firms will have to reduce their energy consumption in order to decrease carbon emissions.
Energy taxes representing a substantial source of revenue for most countries, reactions can be
expected.3 Secondly, the firms involved in the market for TEPs bear an emission abatement
cost and each country may be tempted to help the firms it hosts by reducing energy taxes.4
In this paper we show that the two previous arguments can be handled in a setting of
fiscal competition. We consider heterogeneous firms located in a set of countries. Firms
use fuels for production, and carbon emissions stem from fuels combustion. The emissions
are regulated by a perfectly competitive international market for tradable permits. The
permits are freely given to the firms. Energy taxes levied on fuel consumption are under
the jurisdiction of national governments, whose objective function combines national firms’
profit and energy tax revenue.
We begin by looking at the TEP-market equilibrium. We show that national energy
taxes depress the TEP price: countries have market power on the TEP-market, despite the
competitive behavior of the firms. Such a market power is a source of externalities amongst
This text presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated
by the Belgian State, Prime Minister’s Office, Science Policy Programming. The scientific responsibility is
assumed by the authors.
1The Kyoto protocol came into force in February 2004 and the first commitment period will cover the
years 2008 - 2012.
2The EU-ETS started in January 2005 and is operational since then.
3In 2005 the share of taxes in oil prices borne by the industry was 4.3% in Belgium, 4.8% in Japan, 4.9%
in the United States, 13.6% in Germany, 20.3% in the UK and 46.2% in Italy (source: International Energy
Agency [16]). Energy tax revenue amounts to 5.2% of the total tax revenue on average, for the EU-15 (or
2.4% of GDP), ranging from 3.5% in the Netherlands and Belgium to 6.3% in the UK, 7.7% in Italy, and
8.4% in Portugal (source: Eurostat [12]).
4As an example, a permit price of 30$ per ton of carbon dioxide roughly doubles the price of coal for the
industry.
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countries. Firstly, the tax base of other countries varies because the cost of energy changes,
the so-called fiscal externality. Secondly, the net payments from national to foreign firms
also change because the TEP price varies, the so-called pecuniary externality. Both effects
are known in the capital tax competition literature (see, e.g., Wilson [24] for a survey).
In the analysis of the tax competition game, we pinpoint the three effects which drive
the strategic interaction amongst countries and ultimately determine equilibrium taxes. We
show that the higher the energy consumption, the higher the country’s incentive to tax (tax
base affect ); if national firms’ TEP demand is very responsive to the energy cost, taxation
is discouraged (sensitivity effect); finally, taxation is influenced by the net position of the
country on the market for permits and by its market power (terms of trade effect).
We then use these three effects to analyze several related issues. Firstly, we restrict
country asymmetry in a way that allows us to assume away the terms of trade effect. We
use this framework to study the impact of the total amount of TEPs traded in the market,
the number of participating countries and the very introduction of the TEP-market in a
previously unregulated world. Moreover, this simplified framework allows for a detailed
analysis of equilibrium existence. We then reintroduce the terms of trade effect and show
that larger permit endowments lead countries to tax less. We also highlight the important
strategic difference between importing and exporting countries. The former tax less than
the latter, and it may even happen that a net permit exporting country ends up subsidizing
energy consumption. Finally, we point to one important consequence of considering strategic
tax setting: the international market for tradable permits does not lead to the minimization
of total emission abatement costs. This contradicts the usual textbook wisdom and is due to
the unequal Nash equilibrium tax rates which result from country heterogeneity (itself the
result of firm asymmetry).
Since the pioneer works of Dales [9] and Montgomery [19] the literature on tradable
permits has followed many directions, some of them being related to our subject of concern.5
For many years now the literature has paid attention to the interaction between distortive
taxation and optimal environmental policy. This has been popularized under the (sometimes
fuzzy) concept of double dividend. Goulder [13] provides an authoritative taxonomy of this
concept. Much progress in our understanding of this interaction has occurred. In particular,
Babiker et al. [1] use a CGE model to show that the interplay between carbon policies
and pre-existing taxes can differ markedly across countries, depending on the levels of prior
distortive taxes in an economy. Notably, they argue that climate policies under consideration
will likely not provide a weak double dividend in a number of European countries. This
strand of literature, however, ignores the fact that country-level policies may react to the
implementation of international climate policies.
Actually, the idea that country-level regulation may strategically interact with the mar-
ket for TEPs has been little discussed in the literature6 or it has been addressed in indirect
or implicit ways (see Cropper and Oates [8], Coggins and Swinton [6], Bui [3]). To our
knowledge, the only paper which builds the bridge between TEP markets and tax compe-
5Hence, all the literature comparing the merits of policy instruments (prices versus quantities) is out of
the scope of our analysis. We do not compare instruments, we analyze the implications of adding a new
instrument (tradable permits) on pre-existing ones (energy and carbon taxes).
6For example, Oates’s book [20] on environmental policy and fiscal federalism disregards this issue.
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tition is the one by Santore et al. [23]. These authors examine the strategic behavior of
state-level utility regulators in the context of the US federal trading system on sulfur oxide
emissions. State-level regulators act independently of the federal authority by imposing pol-
lution penalties on their own utilities. Like in our paper, Santore et al. show that emissions
trading is not cost-efficient under fiscal competition.
As regards climate policy issues, the fact that actual TEP markets diverge from the
standard textbook has been addressed recently by Babiker et al. [2]. In particular, these
authors emphasize the fact that the gains from trading can be outweighed by secondary costs
associated with prior tax distortions and market imperfections, providing an illustration with
the CGE model EPPA. In the same spirit, Copeland and Taylor [7] use an international trade
setting to show that the gains from trade can be ruined by terms of trade effects. This calls for
further analyzing how markets for tradable emission permits may interplay with pre-existing
policy instruments.
For that reason, the analysis carried out in our paper encompasses elements from both tax
competition and TEP literatures in a comprehensive theoretical framework. Since countries
tax energy and firms need permits to consume polluting energy, the TEP-market effectively
creates a mobile tax base (the polluting permits). We model tax competition amongst
countries which set energy taxes in a world where an international market for TEPs on
carbon dioxide at the firm level (which parallels the Kyoto carbon market or the EU-ETS)
is implemented. We replicate the basic property of such a setting, as Santore et al. [23],
i.e. the cost-inefficiency stemming from asymmetric national taxes, but we go deeper in
the analysis of the Nash equilibrium in taxes, thus providing a more comprehensive insight
of that market for policy support. In particular, we highlight the importance of the net
importing/exporting position of firms in a given country in the international TEP-market,
which is reminiscent of the effect found in the capital tax competition literature by DePater
and Myers [10] and Peralta and van Ypersele [22].7
The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets out the model
and preliminary results regarding the TEP-market. Section 3 discusses the main forces
driving tax choices and discusses the existence of the Nash equilibrium. The effects of the
total number of TEPs and the number of participating countries in equilibrium taxation
are analyzed in Section 4, while section 5 is devoted to the comparison with autarky. We
analyze the effect of firms’ TEP-endowment and discuss how it can influence the efficiency
of the TEP-market in sections 6 and 7. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
2 The model
There are F firms, indexed by f , located in N countries, indexed by c. The set of firms is
I, i.e., I = {1, 2, . . . , F} and the subset of firms locating in country c is Ic.8 The number of
firms in country c is denoted Fc.
7Wilson [24] provides a comprehensive survey of the tax competition literature.
8Naturally,
N⋃
c=1
Ic = I and
N⋂
c=1
Ic = ∅.
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2.1 Firms
Firms produce a consumption good under a constant returns to scale technology. We have in
mind a short term analysis in which firms are immobile and use energy as the only variable
input. By normalization, each unit of the good is produced using one unit of energy efc.
The firm takes the good price, δ, as given, and chooses the level of energy consumption that
maximizes its profits. We may think of δ as the reservation price that consumers are ready
to pay for the consumption good.9
Energy combustion by firms causes pollution. By normalization, we assume that one
unit of energy consumption yields one unit of pollution emission, which in turn corresponds
to one polluting permit.10 Pollution is regulated with an international market for tradable
emission permits (TEP) in which each firm is price-taker.11 We denote the price of permits
by ρ. Each firm is endowed with e¯f emission permits, so that it buys permits if it chooses to
pollute more than e¯f , and sells a part of its endowment otherwise.
12 Each country imposes
an ad valorem national tax on the energy input, denoted tc. The market for the energy input
is perfectly competitive, with a price normalized to one. Hence, the tax-inclusive price of the
energy input efc, of firm f located in country c , which we shall call cost of energy, writes
pc = ρ+ tc
The choice of efc implies the following trade-off. By decreasing energy consumption, the firm
decreases its energy tax bill, equal to tcefc, and saves the (opportunity) cost of the emission
permits, ρefc. However, the firms’ technology is such that reducing emissions is costly. We
model this feature using the pollution abatement cost function Cf (efc), such that C
′
f < 0
and C ′′f > 0.
13 Firm f located in country c chooses the energy input, efc, to maximize its
profit, given by
Πfc = δefc − tcefc − ρ(efc − e¯f )− Cf (efc),
Hence, efc(pc) is implicitly given by the first order condition,
δ − C ′f (efc) = ρ+ tc (1)
and we have that
defc
dpc
= e′fc = −
1
C ′′f (efc)
< 0,
9Notice that if we model a downward sloping demand we must make an explicit hypothesis about the
market structure of the final good market. This would complicate matters and take us away from our main
motivation, i.e., the interaction between the market of tradable permits and energy taxation through their
effect on firms.
10For example, carbon dioxide emissions are strictly proportional to the carbon content of the fuels.
11This is not a strong hypothesis, for the EU-ETS market covers more than 10,000 installations over 25
countries in the European Union.
12We assume that TEP allocation is given for free. In the EU-ETS, free allocation must represent at least
95% of total allocation in the first phase (2005-2008), and at least 90% in the second phase (2008-2012).
Assuming full or partial auctioning would not alter our results.
13We further impose the following technical conditions: Cf (0)→∞, and limefc→0 C ′′f (efc) = 0.
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hence, when the cost of energy increases, the firm pollutes less. In addition, we suppose that
the demand for permits is (weakly) convex, that is,
d2efc
dp2c
≥ 0
This assumption corresponds to the intuitive property that, as the tax-inclusive price of
emissions (i.e., the cost of energy) increases, emissions decrease, but at a decreasing rate.
2.2 Governments
The introduction of a market for tradable permits for a global pollutant sets a global emission
ceiling, hence the environmental benefit is exogenous for each country and national taxes
are no longer needed for regulating pollutant emissions. Moreover, since the consumer pays
her reservation price of δ for each unit of the final good, the consumer surplus is equal to
zero irrespective of the government’s fiscal choices. Hence, we concentrate on the interaction
between the TEP-market and energy taxation, through the way they both affect firms’
profits. Admittedly, firms’ profits constitute a major concern of governments when it comes
to fiscal decisions regarding energy. Such a concern was behind Sweden and Denmark’s July
2006 appeal to the European Commission for permission to cut their existing carbon taxes
on the trading sector. After the implementation of the EU-ETS, those countries considered
the co-existence of carbon taxes with emissions trading as double taxation, which could
jeopardize their competitiveness. Moreover, many countries are used to subsidizing energy
production or consumption. For example, the OECD survey on Environmentally Harmful
Subsidies (OECD, [21]) reports calculations made by the U.S. Department of Energys Energy
Information Administration (EIA). In the United Sates subsidies to primary energy in 1999
amount to nearly USD 4 billion, of which 60% were tax expenditures.
Consequently we assume that the government maximizes a weighted sum of energy tax
revenue and firms’s profits, the latter with a weight of γ < 1 in the objective function. The
parameter γ may be interpreted as the share of the firm owned by the country’s residents.
Alternatively, it may be the profit tax rate, in which case the government is a revenue
maximizer.14 The objective of the government of country c is to chose the tax rate tc so as
to maximize
Uc =
∑
f∈Ic
(tcefc + γ Πfc) , (2)
where 0 < γ < 1.15
Each firm is characterized by a technology Cf and a permit endowment e¯f . Country
heterogeneity results from differences in the set of firms it hosts, namely: the number of
firms (Fc), firms’ technology (Cf (efc), f ∈ Ic) and/or firms’ permit endowments (e¯f , f ∈ Ic).
14The assumption of revenue maximizing government is reasonable when residents care sufficiently about
the public goods (see Kanbur and Keen, [18]). If the government maximizes a social welfare function with
a redistributive objective then, under revenue constraints, it may be optimal to behave as a net revenue
maximizer, if the welfare gains from higher net revenue are offset the losses due to a net revenue maximizing
policy (see Chander and Wilde, [5]).
15We further suppose that tax rates are bounded such that tc ∈ [t, t¯], with both bounds t and t¯ finite.
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For the purpose of our analysis it will be useful to restrain country heterogeneity. In
particular we will make use of the following two definitions.
The first one is the counter-part in our TEP framework of the usual assumption of
symmetric technology in capital tax competition models (based on a representative firm).
Definition 1 (Technology-comparable countries) Two countries a and b are technology-
comparable if, for each firm in Ia, there is one and only one firm in Ib with the same tech-
nology.
As already mentioned, terms of trade effects are one of the determinants of tax setting
in our framework. In order to better understand the other effects at work and also to be
more precise in the technicalities of the tax game it will prove useful to abstract from terms
of trade in some parts of the analysis. With this objective in mind, we introduce the second
definition.
Definition 2 (Quasi-symmetric countries) Two countries a and b are quasi-symmetric
if they are technology comparable and the total permit endowment of firms in country a is
the same as in country b, i.e.,
∑
f∈Ia e¯f =
∑
f∈Ib e¯f .
Notice that countries are not perfectly symmetric to the extent that the firms sharing
the same technology do not necessarily have the same TEP-endowment. It is the total
TEP-endowment that matters.
Given the central role played by the TEP-market in our analysis, it is useful to begin by
analyzing some of its properties. We do so in the next subsection.
2.3 The market for tradable emission permits
It is out of the scope of this paper to discuss how tradable permits are allocated among
firms.16 We thus take the allocation of permits to individual firms, e¯f , as exogenous. The
emission cap in the global economy is then E¯ =
∑
f∈I e¯f .
Equilibrium in the TEP-market is defined as
N∑
c=1
∑
f∈Ic
efc(pc) =
∑
f∈I
e¯f = E¯ (3)
The following lemma states the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique permit price ρ(t, E¯) that clears the market. Furthermore,
assuming that E¯ <
∑N
c=1
∑
f∈Ic efc(t¯), the equilibrium permit price is strictly positive.
16For such an analysis, see e.g. Helm [14]. For the EU-ETS, national allocations plans have been decided at
the country level, but in close coordination with the EU Commission. See Ellerman et al. [11] for an analysis
of the whole procedure. See also the web site of the European Commission for up-to-date information on
National Allocation Plans (http://ec.europa.eu/environment).
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Notice that to ensure a positive permit price in equilibrium, it suffices to impose a
sufficient restrictive global emission cap.
National energy taxes have an impact on this market since they influence national firms’
energy consumption. Totally differentiating (3), one obtains
dρ(t, E¯)
dtc
= ρtc = −
∑
f∈Ic e
′
fc(pc)∑N
j=1
∑
f∈Ij e
′
fj(pj)
< 0 (4)
The intuition works as follows. If a country increases the tax rate on the energy input,
firms in that country reduce their energy consumption, thus demanding less permits. The
aggregate demand for permits decreases, and, ceteris paribus, the price must decrease to
clear the market. One should note that
defc
dtfc
= e′fc(1 + ρtc) = e
′
fc
∑
j 6=c
∑
f∈Ij e
′
fj(pj)∑N
j=1
∑
f∈Ij e
′
fj(pj)
< 0
That is, if the tax in country c increases, the TEP price decreases, but the cost of energy
increases and the firms in the country pollute less. The lower TEP price leads to an increase
in the emissions in other countries:
defc
dtj
= e′fcρtj > 0
This means that a given country potentially has market power in the TEP-market, since
it may influence the equilibrium price by changing its energy tax rate. To grasp the deter-
minants of countries’ market power, it is useful to perform the following exercise. Suppose
the demand for permits is iso-elastic, with the same elasticity for all firms in a given country.
Let ηc denote the elasticity in country c. Also, let Ec =
∑
f∈Ic efc. Then, we may rewrite
(4) as
ρtc = −
∑
f∈Ic ηfc
efc
pc∑N
j=1
∑
f∈Ij ηfj
efj
pj
= − ηc
Ec
pc∑N
j=1 ηj
Ej
pj
The impact of a given country’s energy tax rate on the TEP price depends on two factors.
On the one hand, the larger the number of firms and their demand for permits, the greater
is the market power of the country. On the other hand, if firms react strongly to the cost
of energy, they have a greater impact on the international market and the country has a
higher market power. In the following section these effects will be further analyzed and we
will show how they interact in equilibrium.
3 Preliminary results
This section is devoted to the formal analysis of the tax competition game. We begin by
identifying the three effects which drive tax setting by national governments. We then
proceed to the analysis of the existence of equilibrium. As it turns out, terms of trade effects
make the existence analysis very cumbersome, so we chose to prove existence in the more
restrictive context of quasi-symmetric countries.
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3.1 Three key equilibrium effects
We solve for a Nash equilibrium in energy taxes. Country c chooses tc so as to maximize
U(t), given by (to save notation, we shall write pc and ρ as a shorthand for ρ(t, E¯), and
pc(t, E¯) = ρ(t, E¯) + tc, respectively)∑
f∈Ic
tcefc (pc) + γ [δefc − tcefc (pc)− ρ (efc (pc)− e¯f )− Cf (efc (pc))]
The first order condition writes
(1− γ)
∑
f∈Ic
efc(pc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tax base effect
+ tc
∑
f∈Ic
defc(pc)
dtc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sensitivity effect
− γρtc
∑
f∈Ic
(efc(pc)− e¯f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Terms of trade effect
= 0 (5)
The above expression identifies the determinants of tax setting by each individual country.
• The tax base effect : the higher the energy consumed by the firms in country c, the
higher the country’s incentive to tax. This is weighted down by γ, for an increase in
the energy tax rate decreases firms’ profits;
• The sensitivity effect : given that the tax base decreases with the tax rate, taxation is
discouraged (when the tax rate is positive);
• The terms of trade effect : it depends both on the aggregate net exporting position of
the country’s firms and on its market power.
It is interesting to notice that the tax base and sensitivity effects actually sum up to a
Laffer curve, modified by (1−γ). Throughout the paper we shall make the natural hypothesis
of concavity of the modified Laffer curve, i.e.,
Assumption 1 (Concavity of the modified Laffer curve)
d
(
(1− γ)∑f∈Ic efc(pc) + tc∑f∈Ic defc(pc)dtc )
dtc
≤ 0
Being slightly lose on the terminology, we say that a country exports permits if the
(equilibrium) net demand for permits by the country’s firms is negative, i.e.,
∑
f∈Ic(efc(pc)−
e¯f ) < 0. We define a permit-importing country analogously. Notice that a permit-exporting
country receives a transfer from importing ones, amounting to the net sales of permits by
the country’s firms (discounted by γ). Since this transfer is increasing in ρ and the country
can manipulate ρ using its energy tax, we may expect exporting countries to set lower taxes
than importing ones (or even subsidize energy). This strategic manipulation of ρ is in both
cases amplified by the market power of the country.
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Besides its impact on the terms of trade effect, the market power of the country also
influences the sensitivity one. To see this, notice that
defc(pc)
dtc
= (1 + ρtc) e
′
fc(pc)
Hence, a higher market power lowers the sensitivity of the tax base to the tax rate, for the
TEP price absorbs a greater share of the tax increase.
Given (5), we have that the Nash equilibrium energy tax of country c is given by the
following implicit function,
tˆc =
(1− γ)∑f∈Ic eˆfc(pˆc)− γρˆtc∑f∈Ic(eˆfc(pˆc)− e¯f )
(1 + ρˆtc)
∑
f∈Ic |eˆ′fc(pˆc)|
=
(1− γ)Êc − γρˆtc(Êc − E¯c)
(1 + ρˆtc)|Êc|
(6)
Where the xˆ denotes equilibrium value of the variable x, and the following notation is used
for convenience:
Êc =
∑
f∈Ic
eˆfc(pˆc), E¯c =
∑
f∈Ic
e¯f , and Êc =
∑
f∈Ic
eˆ′fc(pˆc)
We show in the Appendix that equilibrium taxes as implicitly defined by (6) are finite.17
The type of strategic interaction amongst countries will play an important role in our
analysis. Not surprisingly, the degree of strategic complementarity or substitutability be-
tween tax rates depends on the three key effects. Recall that taxes are strategic complements
(resp. substitutes) if a given country’s optimal reaction to the other’s tax increase is to in-
crease (resp. decrease) its tax rate. Suppose, say, country b increases its tax rate; then, the
net TEP price declines, so the TEP demand in country a grows. Hence, the tax base effect
is a source of strategic complementarity, while the sensitivity effect is a source of strategic
substitutability. As regards the terms of trade effect, we must ignore the second order ef-
fect on ρtc which we cannot a priori sign. An increase in the home tax base implies that
importing countries import more, while exporters export less. In both cases, they face an
incentive to tax more heavily, so that the terms of trade effect is another source of strategic
complementarity. Interestingly, the analysis of the quasi-symmetric case in the next subsec-
tion shows that strategic substitutability can arise, even if the sensitivity effect is limited by
the assumed concavity of the modified Laffer curve.
3.2 Equilibrium with quasi-symmetric countries
The simultaneity of the three effects presented above makes the analysis of equilibrium
existence cumbersome. This difficulty is usual in tax competition models with terms of trade
effects; see, e.g., Peralta and van Ypersele [22]. In their paper about equilibrium existence in
tax competition games, Laussel and Le Breton [17] have to suppose that capital owners are
absent, so as to avoid terms of trade effects. Another way to avoid the terms of trade effect is
17Hence, equilibrium taxes are between t and t¯ for every country c, with the two bounds appropriately
defined.
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to concentrate on quasi-symmetric countries (Definition 2). In this framework, Assumption
1 is sufficient to ensure the existence of a second-order locally consistent equilibrium (2-
LCE). This is a weaker concept of equilibrium, where players use the second-order Taylor
expansion of their payoff function as means to evaluate potential deviations, such that the
equilibrium strategy profile is robust to small deviations by players, i.e., in the neighborhood
of the 2-LCE strategy (see Bayindir-Upmann and Ziad [4] for a first usage of this equilibrium
concept in tax competition games). Moreover, given the continuity of payoff functions, if a
Nash equilibrium exists, then it coincides with the 2-LC equilibrium (Bayindir-Upmann and
Ziad [4]).
Let us define the elasticities of the tax base (ηEc) and the sensitivity (ηEc) effects relative
to the cost of energy, pc, as follows,
ηEc = −
dÊc
dpˆc
pˆc
Êc
and ηEc = −
dÊc
dpˆc
pˆc
Êc
We show in the Appendix that, under the set of equilibrium taxes, Assumption 1 is equivalent
to the following,
Assumption 2 The demand for permits evaluated at the equilibrium taxes respects
ηEc
ηEc
≥ 1− γ
2− γ
We must impose an upper bound on the elasticity of the sensitivity effect, ηEc relative to
the elasticity of the tax base, ηEc . In other words, when the cost of energy increases, the
tax base shrinks (disincentive to tax) and it becomes less sensitive (an incentive to tax). If
this latter effect is too strong relative to the former, the payoff function (the modified Laffer
curve) is not locally concave.
As a preliminary result, the following lemma characterizes equilibrium in a setting of
quasi-symmetric countries.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 2, a second-order locally consistent equilibrium (2-LCE) exists
with all countries setting the same energy tax rate. Moreover, if a Nash equilibrium exists,
then it coincides with the 2-LCE.
When countries are quasi-symmetric, no country is either a net exporter or a net im-
porter of permits. Hence, they face exactly the same incentives to tax and set the same tax
rates in equilibrium. It is important to recall that the agents in the TEP-market are the
asymmetric firms, which consume different quantities of permits, in general different from
their endowments. Hence, they trade permits in equilibrium. The equality of equilibrium
taxes also implies equal tax bases which, used in (4), yields ρtc = −1/N . Using (6) and
taking into account that the terms of trade effect vanishes, we obtain the implicit expression
for equilibrium taxes when countries are quasi-symmetric,
tˆc =
(1− γ)Eˆc(
1− 1
N
) |Eˆc|
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The relationship between the elasticities of the tax base and the sensitivity effect drives
not only the local concavity of the equilibrium, it also determines the strategic complemen-
tarity (or substitutability) among taxes, as well as the stability of the equilibrium. We show
in the Appendix that
Lemma 3 When ηEc > ηEc, taxes are strategic complements, and the equilibrium is stable.
When 1−γ
2−γηEc < ηEc < ηEc, taxes are strategic substitutes, and the equilibrium is stable if and
only if ηEc >
1−γ
3/2−γηEc.
If we recall our previous discussion on the determinants of strategic substitutability, and
the fact that the terms of trade effect is absent from the quasi-symmetric countries setup,
the intuition for the above result becomes straightforward. The optimal reaction of a given
country to the other’s tax increase is to increase its tax rate if the variation of the tax base
is stronger than that of its sensitivity. In that case, taxes are strategic complements. It is
interesting to notice that we may have strategic substitutability even when the elasticity of
the sensitivity effect is bounded to ensure concavity of the payoff functions.
4 Emission cap, number of countries and energy taxes
Having studied the existence on the 2-LC equilibrium, we may use our set up with quasi-
symmetric countries to analyze the interplay between energy taxes and the market for trad-
able emission permits.
4.1 Emission cap
The fundamental feature of the TEP-market is the global emission cap in the economy. The
traditional wisdom about TEP-market is that a strengthening of the global emission cap
unambiguously increases the price of permits, hence the cost of energy, in equilibrium. Does
this still hold under strategic taxation?
One preliminary comment is in order. Suppose one fundamental of the model varies,
changing the Nash equilibrium in taxes. Then, the equilibrium emission level per firm eˆfc
will either increase, decrease, or remain constant, for all the firms in a given country c. This
is a consequence of (1) and the fact that all firms face the same pc. Firms’ heterogeneity
comes from different energy consumption levels; however, they all vary in the same direction.
The following proposition deals with the effect on equilibrium taxes if the market becomes
more constraining, that is, if the total amount of permits is reduced.
Proposition 1 Strengthening the global emission cap increases the costs of energy. Further-
more, if taxes are strategic complements, energy taxes decrease while the TEP price increases;
if taxes are strategic substitutes, energy taxes increase.
When the emission cap becomes more stringent, firms in each country will consume less
permits in equilibrium, so its cost must increase. The shrunk tax base is a disincentive to tax,
while the sensitivity effect is an incentive to tax. The tax rate variation depends on which
of the effects dominates, which also drives the strategic complementarity or substitutability
among taxes.
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4.2 Number of countries
Let us now turn to an enlargement of the TEP-market. One or more countries may join the
market. This is not a mere abstraction in our setting, since we are dealing with a market
which is implemented amongst a set of countries and, logically countries outside this market
may decide to join at some point.18 Regarding the new firms’ TEP-endowment, we impose
the (empirically and politically reasonable) constraint that the market cannot become less
constraining, in the sense of an increase in the average TEP-endowment per firm. Hence, new
firms receive at most the (pre-existing) average endowment. We now check what happens
when the firms receive the exact average endowment. If one is interested in a decrease in
the average TEP-endowment, one may apply Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Suppose the number of countries increases. If the average TEP-endowment
per firm is kept constant, energy taxes decrease, the TEP price increases and the cost of
energy does not vary.
The intuition for this result rests solely on the sensitivity effect. Given that each indi-
vidual country has a lower market power, the tax base is more sensitive, thus discouraging
taxation.
We conclude this section by presenting the following corollary, which highlights the fact
that, in both previous propositions (in the former under strategic complementarity only),
the TEP price varies more than it would if taxes were not to react to TEP-market changes.
We call this the amplifying effect of strategic energy taxation.
Corollary 1 (Amplifying effect of strategic energy taxation) If taxes are strategic com-
plements, the TEP price reacts more to a resizing of the TEP-market under strategic taxation
than if countries would not react by changing tax rates.
5 Comparison with autarky
Having understood the interaction of the TEP-market with energy taxation, we now turn to
the analysis of the likely impact of introducing the market on a previously unregulated world.
In the absence of a TEP-market, the optimal energy consumption by the firms is implicitly
given by δ − C ′f (efc) = tc. Countries maximize (2), with Πfc = δefc − tcefc − Cf (efc). The
first order condition is
(1− γ)
∑
f∈Ic
efc(tc) + tc
∑
f∈Ic
defc(tc)
dtc
= 0 (7)
using the fact that in the absence of the TEP-market defc/dtc = defc/dpc =, the autarkic
energy tax tac is given by
tac = (1− γ)
Eac
Eac
18For example, this may represent the impact of the EU enlargement on the ETS.
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Figure 1: Energy taxes and the introduction of tradable permits
where Eac denotes total emissions under autarky (analogously for Eac ).
Comparison of (7) with (5) identifies the most obvious consequence of introducing the
market: the terms of trade effect shows up as an important determinant of energy taxa-
tion. We abstract from this effect by focusing on quasi-symmetric countries. The following
proposition looks at the effect of introducing a non-constraining TEP-market in the sense
that Eac = E¯.
Proposition 3 Suppose a non-constraining TEP-market is introduced. Then, the costs of
energy remain constant and energy taxes go up.
Introducing a non-constraining TEP-market keeps the tax base at the same level. How-
ever, the sensitivity of the tax base declines, thanks to the partial absorption of the tax
increase by the TEP-price. In other words, the cost of energy varies one-to-one with the
tax rate in autarky, while it varies less under a TEP-market. This effect is responsible for
a tax increase. The so-called run to the bottom result of the tax competition literature is
sometimes interpreted as a decrease in the tax rate when borders are open, i.e., the tax base
becomes mobile. Proposition 3 show that the exact opposite happens in our setting.
We may now combine the results in Propositions 1 to 3 into Figure 1 which relaxes the
assumption of the non-constraining market.
6 Permit endowments and energy taxes
The analysis carried out so far has focused on quasi-symmetric countries i.e. the impact of
terms of trade effects on equilibrium taxes was left out. This simplification allowed us to
gain insights about the market fundamentals (E¯ and N) and the effect of introducing the
market.
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We are now going to analyze the terms of trade effect by focusing on technology compa-
rable countries (see Definition 1). As discussed above, the sufficient second order condition
for equilibrium existence becomes cumbersome so we proceed by assuming the concavity of
the payoff functions, i.e.,
d2Uc
dt2c
≤ 0, ∀ c
that ensures equilibrium existence.
We can state the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose payoff functions are concave and a Nash equilibrium in energy tax
rates exists. Then, if the total TEP-endowment of firms in country a is lower than in country
b, and tax rates are strategic complements, country a sets a higher energy tax than country
b. Moreover, a TEP-importing country sets a higher energy tax than a TEP-exporting one.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 rests on the terms of trade effect, which is an incentive
to tax for an importer, and a disincentive to tax for an exporter. Since the country with
the least endowed firms will (at a given tax rate) either import more, or export less, it
has an incentive to set a higher tax rate. The comparison between importing and exporting
countries depends on the sign of the terms of trade effect : positive for exporters, and negative
for importers. For this result it is crucial that governments care for firms’ profits, i.e., γ
must be bounded away from zero, for otherwise the net importing position of firms in the
international TEP-market is irrelevant for the government.
Notice that when γ is sufficiently high, the terms of trade effect is very important for
the government, and an exporting country may actually subsidize energy. This is always the
case in the limit case where γ = 1 and the country does not care about energy fiscal revenue,
only about firms’ profits.
According to Proposition 4, country ranking in terms of energy taxes is the inverse of
the total firms’ TEP-endowment ranking. The same argument as above allows us to answer
one related question, namely, how does the equilibrium change if we switch the endowments
of the firms in two different countries? We have the following result.
Corollary 2 Suppose a reallocation of TEP endowments such that firms in country a get
more permits and those in country b less, the total amount being kept unchanged. Then the
energy tax decreases in country a and increases in country b, if taxes are strategic comple-
ments.
Note that this result goes through independently of the distribution of firms’ endowments
in each country. All that matters is the change in the aggregate TEP-endowment of the
country.
7 Cost-inefficiency of the market for tradable permits
In setting up a market for permits, the aim is to curb pollution in a cost-efficient way.
This property of TEPs is widely put forward in the literature (since Montgomery [19]) and
14
generally used as an argument by its advocates (see e.g. IEA [15]). This property, stated
without strategic fiscal interactions, is clearly questionable in our more realistic setting. The
allocation of pollution emission is cost-efficient if, for a given quantity of total pollution,
the aggregate emission abatement cost is minimized. Formally, a cost-efficient pollution
abatement is the solution of the following problem
min
{efc}
f∈I
∑
f∈I
Cf (efc) s.t.
∑
f∈I
efc = E¯
Hence, cost-efficiency is attained when C ′f (efc) = κ , ∀f ∈ Ic, where κ is a finite negative
number. We show that, in the case of an international market with fiscal spillovers, this
property does not hold anymore.19 Recalling that the set Ic is different among countries, in
terms of the number of firms, their technologies and TEP-endowment, we state the following
result.
Proposition 5 When countries set energy taxes non-cooperatively, equilibrium taxes are
generically different. Hence, an international market for tradable emission permits is not
cost-efficient.
Proposition 5 relies only on the non-cooperative behavior of asymmetric countries. The
asymmetry amongst countries stems from firm heterogeneity, the very reason why one would
like to implement a TEP-market as a means to achieve cost efficiency in the first place.
This result shows that the efficiency gains of introducing a market are not realized if the
power to tax energy inputs is left to the national initiative.20 This is a worrisome result, in
that empirical evidence confirms strong cross-country differences in energy taxation, which
may be taken as evidence of asymmetries amongst firms locating in each country. This
asymmetry will likely lead countries to set different taxes under the international TEP-
market. Moreover, the relative importance of energy tax revenue in some countries makes it
unlikely that all countries would be ready to give up their fiscal autonomy in this matter.
It is important to notice that country asymmetry per se does not imply asymmetric
taxation, rather it is the non-cooperative behavior that does so. If countries were to cooperate
to minimize total abatement cost they would set equal tax rates. If, instead, they had the
objective of maximizing fiscal revenue, they would set tc = t¯,∀c. This is the usual result in
models of fiscal competition where the tax base is inelastic internationally, which the case
here since
∑N
c=1
∑
f∈Ic efc = E¯.
8 Conclusion
With the background of the establishment of several environmental agreements at the in-
ternational level, we analyze the interaction between an international market for tradable
polluting permits and national energy taxes. The TEP-market introduces a mobile tax base
between countries (the polluting permits), hence it creates room for fiscal competition.
19Indeed, suppose that there are no energy taxes, i.e., tc = 0 in all countries. Then the choice of the
energy input by the firms is such that δ − C ′f (efc) = ρ and cost-efficiency is achieved.
20Unless we restrict country asymmetry, as in Lemma 2.
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Our analysis highlights the effects that drive tax choices: the tax base, the elasticity and
the terms of trade effects. The interplay among these effects allows us to characterize how
equilibrium energy taxes depend on the fundamentals of the market: the total emission cap,
the number of countries which join the market, and firms’ TEP-endowments. We also look
at the impact of introducing the market on a previously autarkic world. Some of our results
hinge on the nature of the strategic interaction amongst countries, i.e., whether taxes are
strategic complements or substitutes. We show that this depends on the relative elasticities
of the tax base and elasticity effects.
Increasing the restrictiveness of the market (i.e., decreasing the emission cap) leads to a
higher costs of energy, while taxes may either increase or decrease, depending on whether they
are strategic substitutes or complements, respectively. On the other hand, if new countries
join the market, then the cost of energy goes up while energy taxes decrease unambiguously.
The introduction of the market has the opposite effect on energy taxation, i.e., countries
increase their energy taxes because the TEP price partially absorbs tax increases, thus
decreasing tax base sensitivity. Looking at firms’ TEP-endowment amounts to analyzing
the impact of the terms of trade effect. We show that, under strategic complementarity,
the country with the more endowed firms sets a lower energy and that importers tax energy
more heavily than exporters. One interesting result of strategic taxation is that there is a
amplifying effect on the TEP price, which in all cases varies more than what it would in the
absence of taxes (when taxes are strategic complements).
Finally, considering strategic taxation leads us to question the usual argument in favor
of an international TEP-market, namely, that it achieves emission reduction in a way that
minimizes total abatement cost. This implies that the TEP-market only leads to cost effec-
tiveness if it is accompanied by a tax harmonization policy. However, the political difficulties
of implementing such an harmonization policy are at the very source of the creation of the
international TEP-market.
One could envisage extending the model in several directions. Introducing a final good
market is likely to discourage energy taxation (in that this causes a further distortion) in a
symmetric way across countries, so that our results would remain qualitatively valid. Such
an extension would call for a rewriting of the countries’ payoff function. The three effects
highlighted in our analysis would still appear and would drive the results in a qualitatively
similar manner. Finally, one could think of introducing a market for the energy input. If
the market is perfectly competitive, our results go through unchanged. If instead it is an
imperfectly competitive market, then the tax effects are likely to be mitigated. Indeed, say,
a tax increase leads to a reduction in the demand for energy, hence decreasing its equilibrium
price. This absorbs a part of the tax increase and leads to a mitigation of its effects, hence
a lower incentive for the strategic use of taxes on behalf of the countries.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Recall the equilibrium condition on the market for TEPs (3). Since
the left-hand side of (3) is strictly decreasing in ρ, for each tax vector t = {t1, . . . tN}, and
the global permits supply E¯ being given, there exists a unique permit price ρ(t, E¯) satisfying
(3). To see that ρ(t, E¯) > 0, notice that
dρ(t, E¯)
dtc
= ρtc = −
∑
f∈Ic e
′
fc(pc)∑N
j=1
∑
f∈Ij e
′
fj(pj)
< 0 (8)
hence the lowest equilibrium ρ(t, E¯) arises when tc = t¯, ∀c. This fact, together with the
assumption that
∑N
c=1
∑
f∈Ic efc(t¯) > E¯ ensures ρ(t, E¯) > 0 when tc = t¯, ∀c, hence it must
also be positive for any other possible tax vector.
Proof that tax rates as defined by (6) are finite From (6), it follows that, in general,
when Ic 6= Id for c 6= d, then tˆc 6= tˆd. In order to ensure finite equilibrium tax rates, we
impose the following conditions on the cost function: Cf (0)→∞, to ensure that the demand
for permits has a slope of 0 when pc goes to ∞, and limefc→0C ′′f (efc) = 0.
Suppose, to the contrary, that:
• tˆc → −∞. Then, country c absorbs all the permit supply, i.e.,
∑
f∈Ic eˆfc = E¯ and we
have that
∑
f∈Ic e
′
fc = −φ, with φ > 0 and finite. In addition, all the other countries
j have
∑
f∈Ij efj = 0 and
∑
f∈Ij e
′
fj → 0, therefore ρtc → 1. Hence, (5) reads
(1− γ)E¯ + tˆc(1 + 1)(−φ) + γ
(
E¯ −
∑
f∈Ic
e¯f
)
> 0,
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contradicting the fact that tˆc is an equilibrium tax.
• tˆc →∞. Then, demand for permits in country c falls to
∑
f∈Ic eˆfc = 0 and
∑
f∈Ic Cf (eˆfc)→∞ . Hence, the country’s utility level is given by∑
f∈Ic
tˆc0 + γ (α0− tc0 + ρe¯f −∞)→ −∞
and the country cannot be optimizing. It is trivial to check that it can do better with
a tax tc = 0 and a finite demand for permits (hence, a finite abatement cost).
Hence, it is trivial to chose t and t¯ to ensure that equilibrium taxes belong to the interval
[t, t¯].
Proof of Lemma 2 We proceed in two steps. First, we show that all countries set the
same tax rate in equilibrium; then, we show that Assumption 1 ensures the existence of a
2-LCE.
(i) Suppose countries do not set the same tax rate in equilibrium and take two countries a
and b with tˆa 6= tˆa. Then, pˆa 6= pˆb and, for each pair of firms with technology f , we have
that eˆfa 6= eˆfb, implying Êa 6= Êb. Since E¯a = E¯b, it follows that Êa − E¯a 6= Êb − E¯b.
Using the fact that
∑N
c=1 Eˆc− E¯c = 0, it follows that there exist at least two countries
a and b such that Êa − E¯a < 0 < Êb − E¯b, implying Êb > Êa, or tˆb < tˆa. Since quasi-
symmetric countries are also technology-comparable, Proposition 2 and the fact that
Assumption 1 is equivalent to Assumption 2 in the case of quasi-symmetric countries
together imply that the TEP-exporter country a sets a lower energy tax than the
TEP-importer country b, and we reach a contradiction.
(ii) Equality of equilibrium taxes implies that Êc = Êd, ∀c, d, and equilibrium in the permit
market then ensures that Êc = E¯d = E¯/N, ∀c, d. Under the set of equilibrium taxes,
the first order condition for each country c reads
(1− γ)Êc + tˆcÊc(1− 1
N
), (9)
from which
tˆc =
(1− γ)E¯c(
1− 1
N
) |Êc| (10)
Using the fact that ρˆtc = −1/N under the equilibrium tax vector, the second order
condition reads (
1− 1
N
)(
(2− γ)Êc + tˆcdÊc
dtˆc
)
,
which, evaluated at tˆc as given by (10), and after straightforward manipulation, yields(
1− 1
N
)
Êc
pˆc
(−(2− γ)ηEc + (1− γ)ηEc)
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where
ηEc = −
dÊc
dpˆc
pˆc
Êc
≥ 0 and ηEc = −
dÊc
dpˆc
pˆc
Êc
≥ 0
which is negative under Assumption 2.
Proof of Lemma 3 Taxes are strategic complements at the Nash equilibrium if
d2Uc
dtˆc dtˆj
= − 1
N
(
(1− γ)Êc + tˆcdÊc
dpˆc
(
1− 1
N
))
=
1− γ
N
Êc
pˆc
(ηEc)− ηEc > 0,
otherwise they are strategic substitutes.
An equilibrium is stable if reaction functions are contractions, i.e.,
∑
j 6=c
∣∣∣∂tc∂tj ∣∣∣ ≤ φ, ∀c,
for some φ < 1. Now, ∑
j 6=c
∂tc
∂tj
= −(N − 1)
d2Uc
dtˆc dtˆj
d2Uc
dtˆ2c
=
ηEc − ηEc
2−γ
1−γηEc − ηEc
, (11)
where the denominator is positive under Assumption 2. When taxes are strategic comple-
ments (ηEc − ηEc > 0), the fact that (2 − γ)/(1 − γ) > 1 ensures that expression in (11) is
below unity. When taxes are strategic substitutes, the numerator is negative so that reaction
functions are contractions when
ηEc − ηEc <
2− γ
1− γ ηEc − ηEc
and simple algebra yields the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1 Notice that
d
dpˆc
(
Êc
Êc
)
=
ÊcdÊc/dpˆc − ÊcdÊc/dpˆc(
Êc
)2 = 1− ηEcηEc (12)
Hence, the ratio ÊcÊc is increasing in pˆc if taxes are strategic complements; otherwise, it is
decreasing. The ratio Êc|Êc| is decreasing if and only if
Êc
Êc is increasing.
Given that E¯c = E¯/N , when E¯ decreases, E¯c = Êc decreases, implying that the price of
energy in each country must increase. By (12), if taxes are strategic complements, Êc/|Êc|
decreases, hence tˆc decreases. The fact that tˆc decreases and pˆc increases implies that ρ
increases. An analogous reasoning applies to the case of strategic substitutes.
Proof of Proposition 2 Supposing that E¯/N rests unchanged, i.e., the endowment per
firm does not change, then Êc/|Êc| remains constant and so does pˆc. The only effect on tˆc
comes through N ,
dtˆc
dN
= (1− γ) Êc|Êc|
d
(
1
1− 1
N
)
dN
< 0
Moreover, since pˆc is constant, ρˆ increases.
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Proof of Proposition 3 Let denote tac the autarky tax, and analogously for other equi-
librium variables. The fact that the market is not constraining implies that E¯ =
∑N
c=1 E
a
c .
and obviously Eac = Eˆc, so that
tˆac =
(
1− 1
N
)
tˆc < tˆc
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) For any two countries a and b and taking the set tˆi/∈{a,b} =
{
tˆi, i /∈ {a, b}
}
as given, we
may rewrite (5) for countries a and b
Φ(tˆa, E¯a, tˆb, tˆi/∈{a,b}) = (1− γ)Êa + tˆaÊa(1 + ρˆta)− γρˆta
(
Êa − E¯a
)
= 0
Φ(tˆb, E¯b, tˆa, tˆi/∈{a,b}) = (1− γ)Êb + tˆbÊb(1 + ρˆtb)− γρˆtb
(
Êb − E¯b
)
= 0
Now take E¯a < E¯b, and suppose that tˆa < tˆb. Then, we have that Êa > Êb and, by
definition of the Nash Equilibrium,Φ(tˆa, E¯a, tˆb, tˆi/∈{a,b}) = 0. Now using, successively,
concavity of the payoff functions, strategic complementarity, and, lastly, the fact that
∂Φ(tc, E¯c)/∂E¯c < 0 we may write
0 = Φ(tˆa, E¯a, tˆb, tˆi/∈{a,b}) > Φ(tˆb, E¯a, tˆb, tˆi/∈{a,b}) > Φ(tˆb, E¯a, tˆa, tˆi/∈{a,b}) > Φ(tˆb, E¯b, tˆa, tˆi/∈{a,b}) = 0
And a contradiction is reached.
(ii) Suppose that a is the importing and b the exporting country, such that Êa− E¯a > 0 >
Êb − E¯b. Notice that from Φ(tˆa, E¯a, tˆb, tˆi/∈{a,b}) = 0 one has
(1− γ)Êa + tˆaÊa(1 + ρˆta) < 0
and from Φ(tˆb, E¯b, tˆa, tˆi/∈{a,b}) = 0 one has
(1− γ)Êb + tˆbÊb(1 + ρˆtb) > 0
The assumption that tˆa < tˆb, together with Assumption 1, imply that (1 − γ)Êa +
tˆaÊa(1 + ρˆta) > (1− γ)Êb + tˆbÊb(1 + ρˆtb), and we reach a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5 Using (6) and (1), it is immediate that cost-efficiency is not
attained.
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